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One hundred and three years after its signing in Berne,
Switzerland, after three years of international negotiations to which
the United States contributed very little, the United States joined the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.1
In its initial implementation act, Congress awarded no protection to
works that had fallen in the public domain.2 Indeed, § 12 of the 1988
*
FedEx Research Professor of Law, Co-Director, Vanderbilt Intellectual Property
Program, Vanderbilt University Law School.
1.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986),
available at www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf [hereinafter Berne
Convention]. The Berne Convention was originally signed in 1886, following three diplomatic
conferences held in Berne, Switzerland, in 1884, 1885, and 1886. A Protocol was added to the
Convention at the time of its adoption in 1886, and the Convention itself was later revised six
times, in 1896, 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, and 1971. See generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.
ORG., BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY 1886–1986 (1986) (discussing the history of the
Convention and providing a summary of the discussions as well as the role of each participating
country) [hereinafter BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY].
2.
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853. See
also H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 52 (1988). The United States’ adhesion to the Convention was
effective on March 1, 1989. See Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?searchwhat=C&country_id=179C (last visited
Sept. 27, 2011) (listing effective dates of treaties to which the United States is a party).
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Act provided that “Title 17, United States Code, as amended by this
Act, does not provide copyright protection for any work that is in the
public domain in the United States.”3
This was challenged as a violation of the Convention provision
on retroactive protection of such works.4 Congress reversed course
when it implemented the Uruguay Round results because it knew its
failure to implement Article 18 could now be challenged before the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Body.5 It thus
reimplemented the Convention by providing extensive protection to
copyright holders and restoring works that had been in the public
domain, while providing limited rights to “reliance parties” that had
been exploiting those works legally without payment or
authorization.6 This is, at its core, the basis of the challenge that has
reached the Supreme Court in Golan v. Holder—namely, that
restoring protection on public domain works violates the constitutional
rights of those reliance parties.
In this Essay, I argue that international rules left Congress
wide latitude to implement Article 18.7 I do not discuss whether the
constitutional arguments against the second implementation are wellfounded, nor do I consider the importance of the public domain in the
copyright pact, matters considered in detail in other contributions to
this Roundtable.8

3.
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 12, 102 Stat
2853, 2860.
4.
Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(1).
5.
Elizabeth Townsend Gard discusses the matter in greater detail in her contribution to
this Roundtable. See Elizabeth Townsend Gard, In the Trenches with § 104A: An Evaluation of
the Parties’ Arguments in Golan v. Holder As It Heads to the Supreme Court, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 199, 204–06 (2011).
6.
In 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act added § 104A
to Title 17 of the United States Code. Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 334, 107 Stat. 2057, 2115. In 1994,
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act amended § 104A in its entirety. Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514,
108 Stat. 4809, 4976–81. Section 104A provides for restoration under certain conditions,
including a presidential proclamation of eligible countries, and makes enforcement subject to
certain formalities, including a notice of intent. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006).
7.
This Essay is based on amicus briefs submitted by the author both in the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals and at the Supreme Court. Brief for Professor Daniel J. Gervais as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. June 17, 2011); Brief for
Professor Daniel J. Gervais as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Golan v. Holder, 609
F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1234).
8.
See Tyler T. Ochoa, Is the Copyright Public Domain Irrevocable? An Introduction to
Golan v. Holder, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 123, 144–46 (2011) (assessing the implications of
removing works from the public domain); David S. Olson, A Legitimate Interest in Promoting the
Progress of Science: Constitutional Constraints on Copyright Laws, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
185 (2011) (arguing that removal of works from the public domain violates the Progress Clause
and the First Amendment).
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I propose to tackle the subject as follows: In Part I, I begin by
considering the origins of Article 18 and lessons that may be gleaned
from its negotiating history. In keeping with Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the
“teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations [may be used] as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law,” I also look to the literature concerning Article 18.9 In
Part II, I consider whether the fact that the substantive provisions of
the Berne Convention were incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement
changed the nature or scope of the obligations imposed on the United
States, and in particular whether the threat of a trade dispute might
warrant a new course of action.10
I. THE BERNE CONVENTION
A. A Detailed Look at Berne Retroactivity
The United States joined the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1989, adhering to its most
recent version, the 1971 Paris Act.11 Article 18 of the Paris Act
addresses how member states should implement the Convention at
their time of entry.12 Article 18(1) provides that: “This Convention
shall apply to all works which, at the moment of its coming into force,
have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin
through the expiry of the term of protection.”13 Article 18(2) goes on to
clarify that “[i]f, however, through the expiry of the term of protection
which was previously granted, a work has fallen into the public
domain of the country where protection is claimed, that work shall not
be protected anew.”14 Proponents of a restrictive reading of these
9.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031,
1060.
10. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement obligates World Trade
Organization members, including the United States, to “comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the
Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto.” Id. art. 9.1.
11. Berne Convention, supra note 1.
12. This scope of protection at implementation is also known as “application in time.” See
WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 13, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/wct/pdf/trtdocs_wo033.pdf
[hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty] (providing that contracting parties must apply the
protections of Berne Convention Article 18).
13. Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(1).
14. Id. art. 18(2) (emphasis added).
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provisions tend to emphasize the “shall” in Article 18(1), but not the
“shall not” in Article 18(2). But the Convention clearly establishes the
principle of protection of existing works in some instances only while
also preserving most of the public domain.15 Taken together, Articles
18(1) and 18(2) provide that a work already in the public domain must
be protected anew—that is, removed from the public domain and
placed (back) in the exclusive domain of the foreign copyright
holder(s)—only in the specific circumstance where: (1) that work both
remains protected in its country of origin, and (2) it is not protected in
the country where protection is claimed for a reason other than the
expiration of a term of protection previously granted (e.g., for failure
to comply with a registration requirement).
I read Article 18(2) as support for the public domain and not, as
proposed in the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)
Guide to the Convention, as a mere exception.16 This view, I suggest,
reflects the ordinary meaning of “shall not” used in the provision, and
it is buttressed by the fact that exceptions in the Convention typically
begin with the phrase (or a variation of the phrase), “it shall be a
matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit.”17 An
example of the application of this principle would be a country joining
the Convention that had a previous term of protection of twenty-eight
years.18 In such a case, a work whose twenty-eight-year term had
expired in that country (i.e., was in the public domain) would not be
protected anew, even if it were still protected in its country of origin.
If, however, the work were still protected in the country of origin and
were not protected in the country joining the Convention due to a
failure to comply with a formality such as registration, then Articles
18(1) and 18(2) would impose an obligation to protect that work and,
accordingly, remove it from the public domain.
The idea that copyright law must be intrinsically balanced is
neither revolutionary nor new. In an 1878 speech, Victor Hugo,
founder of Association Littéraire Internationale—which later became
Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (“ALAI”), the
organization that produced the initial draft of the Berne Convention—
15. Dr. Ficsor also refers to Articles 18(1) and 18(2) as a “single principle.” See MIHÁLY
FICSOR, GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS TREATIES ADMINISTERED BY WIPO AND
GLOSSARY OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS TERMS 99 (2003).
16. Id. at 98.
17. See Berne Convention, supra note 1, arts. 2(2), 2(4), 2(7), 2bis(1), 2bis(2), 7(4), 9(2), 10(2),
10bis(1), 10bis(2), 11bis(2), 11bis(3), and 14bis(2)(c). In this sense, Article 18(2) is much more like
Article 10(1), which provides that “[i]t shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which
has already been lawfully made available to the public . . . .” (emphasis added).
18. As opposed to the Berne Convention minimum of the life of the author plus fifty years.
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
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made it plain that copyright law should protect literary property but
maintain a public domain in parallel. Hugo believed that if one must
choose between the rights of the writer or the rights of the “human
spirit,” then the rights of the writer must be sacrificed because the
public interest must come before everything else.19
In recognition of the very real hardship imposed on parties who
relied on their legitimate right to exploit unprotected works,20 Article
18(3) provides that the above principles “shall be subject to any
provisions contained in special conventions to that effect existing or to
be concluded between countries of the Union. In the absence of such
provisions, the respective countries shall determine, each in so far as
it is concerned, the conditions of application of this principle.” Under
Article 18(3), Berne Union members thus have two options: making a
special convention or determining “conditions.”
On the former option, a special convention such as the TRIPS
Agreement could have been used to modify Article 18 or to determine
a more precise set of conditions for copyright protection. The TRIPS
Agreement was negotiated in the relevant time frame for U.S.
implementation of the Berne Convention (that is, between 1987 and
1994).21 The United States negotiated that moral rights22 protected
under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention not be incorporated into the

19. Victor Hugo, Opening Speech at the International Literary Conference (June 17, 1878),
available at http://www.sens-public.org/IMG/pdf/SensPublic_VHugo_DiscoursCongres
International.pdf. The relevant part of the speech reads as follows, in the original French:
Constatons la propriété littéraire, mais, en même temps, fondons le domaine public. . . .
Le livre, comme livre, appartient à l’auteur, mais comme pensée, il appartient—le mot
n’est pas trop vaste—au genre humain. Toutes les intelligences y ont droit. Si l’un des
deux droits, le droit de l’écrivain et le droit de l’esprit humain, devait être sacrifié, ce
serait, certes, le droit de l’écrivain, car l’intérêt public est notre préoccupation unique, et
tous, je le déclare, doivent passer avant nous.
To my knowledge, this is one of the very first times the expression “public domain” was used in
relation to copyright.
20.
See 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT &
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 333 (2d ed. 2006) (noting the
need, under Article 18, “to strike some balance between . . . ‘acquired rights’ or ‘reliance interests’
and the newly recognized rights of the foreign author”).
21. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 12–27
(3d ed. 2008).
22. Moral rights are nonpecuniary rights that an (individual) author has in a work because
he has created it. The minimalist version contained in the Berne Convention provides that an
author (a) may claim authorship even after transferring his economic rights to the work, Berne
Convention, supra note 1, art. 6bis(1); (b) may oppose “any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation,” id.; and (c) has the right to be mentioned (provided his
name appears on the work) when a work is used in a quotation or “by way of illustration in
publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching,” id. art. 10.
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TRIPS Agreement.23 It also could have tried to obtain concessions on
retroactive protection. It did not even ask. There is no evidence to
suggest that this was because either (a) negotiators knew they would
not get it or (b) they were afraid that by asking for this flexibility they
would have to give up something else.24 In fact, asking U.S. trading
partners, in particular Europeans, to agree to the exclusion of moral
rights was not an easy task.25 Moral rights matter a great deal to most
European countries and to others around the world.26
The second option, absent a special convention, is to impose
“conditions” on domestic implementation of Berne. Here, the Berne
Convention imposes no particular limits or requirements on such
conditions. A country joining the Berne Convention may decide to offer
protection to parties who have relied on a work in the public domain
(so-called “reliance parties”), though under the Convention it does not
have to do so. Conversely, while the Convention clearly requires that
some level of protection be given to foreign authors whose works have
entered the public domain (other than by expiration of previous
copyright), the scope of that protection is essentially left to the
discretion of each member state.
In their Golan briefs, the United States and others, including
the International Publishers Association, argue that Article 18(3)
should be interpreted narrowly, and that Berne Convention members
should strive to limit the protection of reliance parties as much as
possible, because Article 18 establishes a baseline principle that
existing works should be protected at the time of adhesion to the
Convention.27 I suggest that such a position, which Respondents may
see as normatively desirable, actually lacks a textual basis in the
Convention and contradicts what the Convention drafters intended.
This is for at least two reasons: First, Respondents’ position is hard to
reconcile with Article 18(2)’s principle that works “shall not be
protected anew” if their term of protection has expired. Articles 18(1)
and 18(2) read together make clear that, if a work has fallen into the
public domain because its term of protection expired either in the
23. The second sentence of Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement excludes the possibility of
raising a violation of Article 6bis and other related provisions in the dispute-settlement process of
the World Trade Organization. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 9(1).
24. See Townsend Gard, supra note 5, at 206 (arguing that the United States could have
negotiated an exception to Berne Article 18 as it did with moral rights).
25. See GERVAIS, supra note 21, at 213–18.
26. See 1 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 20, at 171 (finding “substantial compliance”
in relation to morals rights).
27. Brief for the Respondents at 46–49, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. Aug. 2011); Brief
for the International Publishers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 35–38,
Golan, No. 10-545 (U.S. Aug. 4, 2011).
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work’s country of origin or in the country where protection is claimed,
then it need not be protected when the Convention enters into force.
Article 18(2)’s “shall not” may be read as more than the mere
possibility of not applying retroactive protection.28 Second, a
restrictive reading of Article 18 is contrary to the international legal
norm that states can do all that is not prohibited by international
law.29 Article 18(3) specifically provides that states can decide which
conditions to impose when restoring copyright protection. To hold that
the Convention requires any more would render the language of
Article 18(3) superfluous.
Indeed, the text of the Convention could be construed to take
the diametrically opposite position—that it is desirable to apply
retroactive protection narrowly. For example, Article 18(2) does more
than simply state that a work should not be restored to copyright if its
term of protection has expired. Instead, it affirmatively commands
member states that such works “shall not be protected.” One might
argue (rightly in my view) that there is little prospect of a case being
filed to defend the public domain on the basis of an Article 18(2)
violation, but the normative value of the statement remains intact. A
similar sentiment against overbroad protection is found in Article 7,
which contains a rule known as the “comparison of the terms of
protection.” Under Article 7, a Berne Convention member country does
not have to extend protection to a work no longer protected in its
country of origin—for example, if the country of origin has a shorter
term.30 Finally, an expansive application of retroactivity under Berne
violates the cardinal principle of copyright that people can use the
public domain at will so that the copyright cycle can continue, making
copyright “‘the engine of free expression.”31 Removing works from the
public domain goes against this principle and thus should be
considered with utmost caution.32 The argument that Article 18(3)
28. But see FICSOR, supra note 15, at 98 (“It is not an obligation to apply the Convention to
those works which, at the moment of the coming into force of the Convention, have fallen into the
public domain in the country of origin . . . .” (emphasis added)). The “shall not” language may
imply more than a possible opt-out.
29. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 135 (June 27) (noting that “in international law there are no rules, other
than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise”).
30. Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(8) (“[T]he term shall be governed by the
legislation of the country where protection is claimed; however, unless the legislation of that
country otherwise provides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the country of origin of
the work.” (emphasis added)). This principle is also known as “the Rule of the Shorter Term.”
31. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
32. See Thomas Gordon Kennedy, GATT-Out of the Public Domain: Constitutional
Dimensions of Foreign Copyright Restoration, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 545, 578 (1996).
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B. Lessons from Berne’s Negotiating History
The negotiating history of the Berne Convention confirms that
member states were meant to have significant leeway in setting the
level of retroactive protection afforded to works already in the public
domain.33 Article 14 in the original 1866 text of the Convention—the
provision corresponding to Article 18 in the 1971 Paris Act—read as
follows: “Under the reserves and conditions to be determined by
common agreement, this Convention shall apply to all works which at
the moment of its coming into force have not yet fallen into the public
domain in the country of origin.”34 Thus, the original extent of a
member state’s obligation under Article 18 was left to be defined in a
separate “common agreement.” That agreement was ultimately
codified in the Final Protocol of September 9, 1886 (adopted the same
date as the original text of the Convention). Paragraph 4 of the
Protocol reads:
[1] The common agreement provided for in Article 14 of the Convention is established as
follows: [2] The application of the Convention to works which have not fallen into the
public domain at the time when it comes into force shall take effect according to the
relevant provisions contained in special conventions existing, or to be concluded, to that
effect. [3] In the absence of such provisions between any countries of the Union, the
respective countries shall regulate, each in so far as it is concerned, by its domestic
legislation, the manner in which the principle contained in Article 14 is to be applied.35

The Final Protocol thus only established a general principle
that there should be some retroactive protection, leaving it up to each
country to decide how that principle should be applied.36 The Records
of the 1885 Diplomatic Conference (where the parties agreed upon the
text of Article 14) are very clear: “As noted below, in connection with
the Final Protocol, the implementation of the above Article [14] will be
33.
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, specifically permits use of the negotiating history as an interpretive tool.
34.
Berne Convention (original text of Sept. 9, 1866) art. 14 in BERNE CONVENTION
CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 228. All original texts were in French, and the translations here are
all from BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY.
35. Berne Convention, Final Protocol of Sept. 9, 1886 ¶ 4, in BERNE CONVENTION
CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 228 (emphasis added).
36. It is of note that, at the time of the Paris revision, France proposed deletion of the
reference to “conditions” in Article 14 and only a limited ability “to adopt transitional measures
on the part of new accessions under paragraph 4 of the Closing [Final] Protocol.” 1 RICKETSON &
GINSBURG, supra note 20, at 336. The proposal was met by German and British opposition “on
the ground that, despite the lapse in time, absolute retroactivity might still injure ‘legitimate
[reliance] interests.’ ” Id.
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left to each country of the Union, which will decide on the conditions of
retroactivity according to its own laws or specific conventions.”37
At the 1908 Revision Conference held in Berlin, Germany,
Article 14 became Article 18 and the provisions of the Final Protocol of
1886, as amended in Paris in 1896, were incorporated into a single
Article. Because Article 18 essentially took its final form at the 1908
Conference, the discussion on retroactive application at that
Conference is illuminating. The Report of that Conference reads in
part: “Account had to be taken of the de facto situation existing in
certain countries at the time the Convention came into force, of the
interests of those who might have lawfully reproduced or performed
foreign works without their authors’ authorization.”38 There was thus
a clear acknowledgment, over a hundred years ago, that certain third
parties might have had legitimate interests in works that would be
retroactively protected under the new Convention.
One notable difference between the 1886 version and the
current version (adopted in 1908) is that, while the former allowed
countries to “regulate, each in so far as it is concerned, by its domestic
legislation, the manner in which the principle contained in Article 14
is to be applied,” the latter allows countries to “determine, each in so
far as it is concerned, the conditions of application” of the principle of
restoration.39 The current text is thus not limited to regulation by
legislation; a court, for example, can now determine appropriate
conditions for retroactive protection under the Convention. Indeed, the
WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention specifically notes that “it is a
matter therefore for each member country to decide on the limits of
this retroactivity and, in litigation, for the courts to take into account
these acquired rights [of reliance parties].”40

37.
Records of the Second International Conference for the Protection of Artistic and
Literary Works, Convened in Berne September 7 to 18, 1885, in RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra
note 20, app. 23 at 136, http://www.oup.com/uk/booksites/content/9780198259466/15550023 (last
visited Sept. 22, 2011). The 1896 Additional Act of the Convention modified Paragraph 4 of the
Final Protocol to make it applicable to translations and to “new accessions to the Union.” Berne
Convention, Additional Act and Interpretative Declaration of Paris of May 4, 1896, in BERNE
CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 228.
38. Records of the Conference Convened in Berlin October 14 to November 14, 1908, in
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 20, app. 26 at 215, http://www.oup.com/uk/booksites/content/
9780198259466/15550026 (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
39. Compare Berne Convention, Final Protocol of Sept. 9, 1886 ¶ 4, in BERNE CONVENTION
CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 228 (emphasis added), with Berne Convention, supra note 1, art.
18(3).
40. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 186 (1978).
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The much more recent WIPO Copyright Treaty was adopted on
December 20, 1996.41 It was originally conceived as a possible protocol
to the Berne Convention, but it eventually became a freestanding
instrument.42 Its application in time43 mirrors Article 18 of the Berne
Convention.44 The Records of the Diplomatic Conference at which that
treaty was adopted contain the following statement from the
Conference chairman, discussing possible options for a provision on
application in time:
[The chairman] believed that . . . there would be no retroactive effect concerning prior
acts[,] and the provisions of the Treaty would not introduce an obligation to countries to
change their laws in such a way that prior agreements would be changed. He felt that
that was in most countries probably already constitutionally prohibited. . . . He
acknowledged that revival of rights in some cases would cause practical problems.45

The authors of the Berne Convention were undeniably aware of
the problems that would be caused by its application to works in the
public domain. Article 18 thus grants wide discretion to members to
determine the conditions of applying retroactivity.
C. Lessons from the Literature
The academic commentary on Article 18 confirms that, from
the beginning, member states were left with broad implementing
discretion. Indeed, as Sam Ricketson reiterated in the second edition
of his Berne Convention commentary, Article 18(3) “leave[s]
considerable latitude to countries as to how they will implement the
principle of retroactivity, enabling them to safeguard any rights which
have been acquired in the previous situation where no legal protection
applied.”46 As a result, “wide differences are to be seen in the
provisions adopted by member countries.”47
Does this latitude relate to the duration of reliance-party
measures? It is difficult to conclude from the text of the Convention
that any measure adopted under Article 18(3) must be brief—or
41. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 12. The United States adhered to the WIPO
Copyright Treaty as of March 6, 2002. See Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.
ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=16 (last visited Sept. 22, 2011)
(listing contracting parties to the WIPO Copyright Treaty and effective dates).
42. See MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET 18–19, 122–29 (2002)
(describing the development of the Berne Convention).
43. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
44. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 12, art. 13.
45. 2 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON
CERTAIN COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS QUESTIONS, GENEVA 1996, at 727 (1999)
(emphasis added).
46. 1 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 20, at 342.
47. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1942461

Gervais_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]

10/3/11 9:42 AM

BERNE CONVENTION CONSTRAINTS

157

indeed, even temporary. It must be transitional, which is by definition
a measure meant to ensure an orderly transition from non-Berne to
Berne status. But transitional is not synonymous with brief or shortlived.48
William Briggs wrote one of the earliest detailed commentaries
on the Berne Convention published in English.49 Discussing Article 14
(the predecessor to Article 18), Briggs notes:
These qualifications [in the Final Protocol] proceeded from a desire to safeguard vested
interests. In the absence of international protection foreign works had at one time been
universally looked upon as lawful objects for native reproduction, either in their original
form, or by adaptation or translation. Capital had been sunk, labour had been employed
in making these valuable reproductions; lawful interests had been thereby created, and
a quasi-property had thus been acquired. A State which had tolerated the
indiscriminate reproduction of foreign works would hardly be justified in giving an
unqualified consent to the principle of retroactivity, without making due provision for
the securing of this quasi-property. Hence the rule of Art. 14 was not made absolute,
and it was left to each country to regulate by particular agreement or by domestic law
the mode in which it should be applied.50

Briggs goes on to note that proposals by Belgium and France to
remove the flexibility contained in the Final Protocol were defeated at
the 1896 Revision Conference.51 He also quotes the United Kingdom’s
legislation implementing Berne, providing that “nothing . . . shall
diminish or prejudice any rights or interests arising from or in
connection with [the production of any work in the United Kingdom
prior to the entry into force of the Berne implementation act] which
are subsisting and valuable . . . .”52 Briggs then references a case in
which a British court would have been prepared to let a reliance party
produce fresh copies of a work even after the application of the
implementing act, if the reliance party “had not himself recouped for
his outlay.”53

48. As discussed above, Articles 18(1) and 18(2) of the Berne Convention establish that a
work already in the public domain should not be protected anew unless it remains protected in
the country of origin and fell out of copyright in the country where protection is claimed by
reason other than expiration of the term. See supra Part I.A. Article 18(3) must be interpreted as
conferring latitude to effect its purpose—namely, protecting the legitimate rights of reliance
parties for as long as is required. Additionally, proposals to set specific time limits in Article
18(3) were rejected by Berne member states. See Arpad Bogsch, WIPO Views of Article 18, 43 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 181, 191 (1995) (quoting minutes from the 1884 Berne conference).
49. WILLIAM BRIGGS, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT (1906).
50. Id. at 265.
51. Id. at 266.
52. Id. at 268.
53. Id. at 268–69. The case is Hanfstaengl v. Holloway, [1893] 2 Q.B. 1 (Eng.). During the
1884 Berne Conference, it was noted that possible protection of reliance parties was not limited
to copies in existence at the time of application of the Convention but could also extend to copies
“in the process of being completed.” BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 92.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1942461

Gervais_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

158

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC

10/3/11 9:42 AM

[Vol. 64:147

Irwin Karp prepared a complete study of the application of
Article 18 in the United States.54 Karp notes, first, that because most
European countries adhered to the Convention in the late nineteenth
or early twentieth century, the issue of retroactive protection has all
but disappeared from policy radars in those jurisdictions.55 In
addition, very few of these European countries had registration
systems.56 Citing the opinion of “many United States and most foreign
copyright experts,” Mr. Karp concludes that while the United States
had “considerable leeway in fashioning the conditions of retroactivity,”
it did not have enough leeway to “deny any degree of retroactivity.”57
In other words, imposing conditions may not include a complete
absence of application of the principle of limited restoration. Yet, any
set of conditions under which the principle is applied would be
sufficient to meet U.S. obligations under the Convention.
Hence, when the United States adopted a minimalist approach
upon joining the Convention by failing to provide any retroactive
protection, it pushed the boundaries of Article 18(3) too far.58 The
current implementation of Article 18, however, does much more than
Berne requires to protect copyright holders (and correspondingly, to
reduce the protection of reliance parties). It is a transition from one
extreme to another.
Nearly concurrently with Karp’s study, WIPO Director General
Arpad Bogsch published his views on Article 18 during the debates on
the United States accession to the Berne Convention.59 In a letter to
the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Bogsch notes that the
“principle” referred to in Article 18(3) is the one described in Articles
18(1) and 18(2)—that at least some retroactivity be afforded.60 He also
argues that, while a country can impose conditions on the application
of the principle, the principle must be applied in some way, thus
ruling out a complete absence of retroactivity.61 With respect to
transitions, Bogsch argues that a comment in the negotiating history
suggests that Article 18(3) only allows transitional measures.62
However, even if one accepts this postulate, Article 18(3) conditions

54. Irwin Karp, Final Report, Berne Article 18 Study on Retroactive United States
Copyright Protection For Berne and Other Works, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 157 (1996).
55. Id. at 167.
56. Id. at 172.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
59. Bogsch, supra note 48.
60. Id. at 190.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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are by definition transitional, in that their purpose is to ensure the
switch from non-Berne status to Berne status. As noted above,
transitional measures are not necessarily short-lived, though they
often will be in practice because reliance parties may stop using
certain works over time. But that is the decision of the reliance
parties. Certainly, the Convention does not impose any specific time
limit here, unlike in Article 13(2).63 Under the interpretive canon
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if Convention negotiators
specifically included a two-year period in Article 13(2), it is reasonable
to assume that they could have included one in Article 18(3), but chose
not to do so. Indeed, Bogsch himself quotes a diplomatic conference
record rejecting a proposal to restrict the period in which new Berne
countries could impose conditions to two years.64 There is simply no
authority to support the conclusion that any member state agreed to a
similar mandate that transitional measures be short-lived or limited
to two years.65
Most other senior scholars seem to share this view that Berne
members have a very limited obligation under Article 18. Silke von
Lewinksi states in her recent book that “countries have some leeway
in determining the conditions of application [of Article 18]. However,
they must not go as far as entirely to deny the application of Articles
18(1) and 18(2) of the Berne Convention.”66 In the same vein,
Professor Paul Goldstein writes: “Article 18(3) of the Berne
Convention gives member countries considerable leeway to meliorate
the prejudice suffered by users when a work they correctly believed
was in the public domain is restored to copyright.”67
II. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
A. Retroactivity Obligations Under TRIPS
There is no doubt that copyright law supports a major export
sector of the U.S. economy and that international copyright relations

63. See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 13(2) (providing a two-year window for
reproduction of certain recorded works).
64. Bogsch, supra note 48, at 191.
65. Bogsch refers to a “quite general agreement” that measures taken under Article 18(3)
should not be applied for a period of more than two years, but the only precedent he cites is in
Article 13(2), which governs recorded musical works—not Article 18(3). Id. at 192.
66. SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 184 (2008)
(emphasis added).
67. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES,
LAW, AND PRACTICE 295 (2d ed. 2010) (emphasis added).
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matter.68 It is similarly clear that the Berne Convention and the
TRIPS Agreement are important in this context. Furthermore, it
seems reasonable to argue that, wherever possible, an interpretation
of U.S. law that conforms to treaties ratified by the U.S. Senate is
preferable.69 This does not imply, however, that where those
international instruments leave parties ample flexibility in
implementing their obligations, they should be interpreted as giving
strict directions.
As noted earlier, Article 18(3) of the Berne Convention provides
that the principles stated in Articles 18(1) and 18(2) “shall be subject
to any provisions contained in special conventions . . . concluded
between countries of the Union.” The TRIPS Agreement could be
considered a “special convention” under Article 18(3) if it restricted
the United States’ ability to determine appropriate conditions of
retroactive protection. But it does not: TRIPS provides that “copyright
obligations with respect to existing works shall be solely determined
under Article 18 of the Berne Convention (1971).”70 The TRIPS
Agreement also incorporated Article 18 of the Berne Convention by
reference.71 As such, TRIPS does not modify the obligations contained
in Article 18.
Could the U.S. negotiators have done it differently? I believe
that the answer is yes. As noted above, the United States obtained a
significant concession not to have moral rights enforceable in the
World Trade Organization. This may be considered a special
agreement under Article 18(3).72 But such exceptions and special
conventions must be negotiated. Though the TRIPS Agreement
renders the Berne Convention subject to the dispute-settlement
mechanism of the WTO, it is a long-standing principle that WTO
agreements should not be interpreted to include concessions not
explicitly bargained for.73

68. See, e.g., STEPHEN E. SIWEK, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE ECONOMIC
CONTRIBUTION OF COPYRIGHT-BASED INDUSTRIES IN USA 6 (2004), available at http://www.wipo
.int/ip-development/en/creative_industry/pdf/ecostudy-usa.pdf. (“[T]otal revenue generated from
foreign sales of the core copyright industries is estimated to be at least $89.26 billion in 2002
. . . .”).
69. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains, and consequently can never be construed . . . further than is warranted by
the law of nations as understood in this country.”).
70. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 70.2.
71. Id. art. 9.2.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 21–26.
73. For example, in discussing an exception invoked by Brazil, the panel noted: “nothing
indicates that the failure to remove this clause was something that developing countries
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Without a special convention in place to modify Article 18, we
must interpret that Article as it stands. This approach leads to
recognizing the flexibility contained in Article 18(3). In interpreting
the Berne Convention provisions incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement, dispute-settlement panels have referred to the negotiating
history of the Convention.74 Attempts during the negotiations to cabin
Article 18 by limiting reliance-party measures to a two-year window
failed, as had happened at the Paris Conference of 1896.75 Taken
together with the absence of any statement restricting the scope of
Article 18(3) in the Convention, the record suggests that a future WTO
panel is unlikely to read significant restrictions into that provision.
This flexible interpretation is consonant with TRIPS. The WTO
notes in its “Introduction to TRIPS” that WTO members “issued a
special Declaration at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November
2001. They agreed that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not
prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. They
underscored countries’ ability to use the flexibilities that are built into
the TRIPS Agreement.”76 This is reflected in several provisions of the
Agreement itself, including Article 1.1, which provides in part that
“Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
system and practice.”77 Other examples include Articles 13, 26.2 and
30, which allow members to provide unspecified exceptions in their
national laws to copyright, design, and patent rights, respectively.
B. The Likelihood of a Trade Dispute
ASCAP’s amicus brief in Golan asserts that a violation of
TRIPS would entail dire consequences in the form of trade-based
retaliation.78 This statement has not been verified empirically. The
bargained for.” Panel Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, 43 n.140,
WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/46r.pdf.
74. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States — Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, ¶¶
6.45–6.47, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu
_e/1234da.pdf [hereinafter United States — Copyright Act].
75. The provision equivalent to Article 18 at the time was Paragraph 4 of the Final
Protocol of 1886. See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.
76. Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2011) (emphasis
added).
77. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 1.1.
78. See Brief for the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 37, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. Aug. 2011)
(arguing that excessive exemption of reliance parties from restoration provisions would “expose
the United States to trade sanctions pursuant to international trade agreements in which the
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United States has lost a number of disputes at the WTO, including
two that found U.S. law in violation of TRIPS.79 The panel reports
date back to 2000 and 2002, and neither one has been implemented by
the United States.80 Yet no trade-based sanctions have been applied
by the European Union, which won both cases.81 In fact, since the
inception of the WTO on January 1, 1995, the instances of actual
trade-based retaliation against any country for a WTO violation have
been exceedingly rare. The Dispute Settlement Understanding
(“DSU”), which governs the WTO dispute-settlement process, makes it
clear that other means of solving disputes are preferable.82
In sum, while a TRIPS violation might theoretically lead to
dispute-settlement proceedings at the WTO—which in turn might lead
to trade-based retaliation—this possibility is remote. More
importantly, as long as there is some degree of retroactive protection
of public domain works, the principle contained in Articles 18(1) and
18(2) of the Berne Convention may be said to have been applied, and
thus no TRIPS violation would be found.83
III. CONCLUSION
When the United States joined the Berne Convention, Congress
ignored Article 18. There is no doubt that the United States was in
violation of its obligations at that point.84 When joining the WTO and
United States needs to participate so that American businesses can compete successfully in
international markets”).
79. United States — Copyright Act, supra note 74, ¶ 7.1(b); Appellate Body Report, United
States — Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 360, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2,
2002),
available
at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/us-section211(ab).pdf
[hereinafter United States — Omnibus Appropriations Act].
80. A panel report makes a recommendation if it finds that one or more WTO obligations
are not complied with, but the implementation of the report is then transferred to the Dispute
Settlement Body of the WTO, essentially an assembly of all WTO Members.
81. In the second case, the EU won on one point, namely that sections 211(a)(2) and (b) of
the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, violate the
national-treatment and most-favored-nation obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. United
States — Omnibus Appropriations Act, supra note 79, ¶ 360. In the first case, the music licensing
(“homestyle”) exemption contained in the U.S. Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(b)) was found to
be in violation of TRIPS. United States — Copyright Act, supra note 74, ¶ 7.1(b).
82. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art.
3(7), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (providing in part that (a) “[t]he aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is
to secure a positive solution to a dispute;” (b) “[a] solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a
dispute . . . is clearly to be preferred;” and (c) retaliation is a “last resort”).
83. See supra Part I.A.
84. As Professor Townsend Gard explains in her article, the official reason for failure to
restore works was that Congress required a thorough examination of the issue. Townsend Gard,
supra note 5, at 204.
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the TRIPS Agreement, the United States had to consider the
possibility that its nonimplementation of Article 18 would be
challenged under the DSU. It then overimplemented Article 18 by
restricting the public domain much more than required by Article 18.
That provision states that a work already in the public domain should
be protected anew only where (1) that work remains protected in its
country of origin, and (2) it is not protected in the country where
protection is claimed for a reason other than the expiration of a term
of protection previously granted (e.g., for failure to comply with a
registration requirement).85
The risks to U.S. copyright holders of a lesser level of
implementation have been exaggerated, as has been the risk of tradebased retaliation if a violation of Berne and/or TRIPS was found. The
United States has the necessary leeway to implement its Berne
obligations in a way that protects the legitimate interests of both
authors and users of copyrighted works.

85.

See supra Part I.A.
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